Florida Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 3

Article 2

December 1966

Theory and Practice in Law
Iredell Jenkins

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Iredell Jenkins, Theory and Practice in Law, 19 Fla. L. Rev. 404 (1966).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Jenkins: Theory and Practice in Law

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LAW*
IREDELL JENKINS**

The most revealing point about this symposium is the simple
fact that it should have been felt to be important to hold it. Lawyers
are men who practice law: it is their business to apply a body of
legal doctrine to the resolution of particular cases. Jurisprudence
is the study of legal theory: it is the business of those engaged
in it to lay bare the essential functions, structures, and values of law.
There is certainly no contradiction, and there should be no conflict,
between these undertakings. Rather, we are so accustomed to the
peaceful and fruitful cooperation of the man of thought and the
man of action- between scientist and engineer, medical researcher
and physician, economist and industrialist, statistician and politician- that we take it entirely for granted.
But that assumption is clearly invalidated in the field of law
at the present time, and this symposium is indeed of vital importance. For the virtual rupture of relations between legal theory and
practice has been widely noted and has been the subject of intense
and increasing concern. There is violent disagreement regarding
the assignment of responsibility for this situation: practitioners blame
the theoreticians, condemning their work for its sterility, preciosity,
and banality; theoreticians reply by accusing the practitioners of
vocationalism, parochialism, and a total absorption in technical matters. In a word, legal practice is stigmatized as a means that pursues
no end beyond victory in the instant case, and legal theorizing is
condemned as depicting ends with no consideration for the means
to secure them. So theory and practice alike regard the other as
irrelevant. I am neither competent nor concerned to assess fault
in this matter: indeed, I think there has been little fault, save in
the sense that both parties have allowed themselves to drift with
events and so have failed to realize that if man does not constantly
seek to master circumstances he must become their victim. What is
involved here, to put it so, is nonfeasance rather than misfeasance
or malfeasance.
The point of real significance in this dispute is the wide agreement that the relationship between legal theory and practice has
become seriously dislocated and needs to be restructured. It is my
*The author gratefully acknowledges grants from the Rockefeller Foundation,
the American Philosophical Society, and the University of Alabama Research
Committee, which have supported the larger work of which this article is a part.
*Professor of Philosophy and Chairman of Department, University of Alabama.
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intention in this paper to explore the causes of this dislocation, to
measure its significance, and to make some suggestions regarding its
correction. I think the crux of this matter is that those who are
engaged respectively in the theoretical investigation and the practical application of law have lost effective touch with one another.
To state this point more fully, and thus to make explicit the attitudes
and convictions that underly my inquiry, I think that each of these
groups has misconceived its role, has failed to assume or even to
recognize its full responsibility, and consequently has been unable
to make its proper contribution to the total enterprise of law.
The relationship between jurisprudence and the working lawyer
is of course merely a special case of a broader issue: that, namely, of
the generic character of the relations between theory and practice.
This issue is both pervasive and perennial. It makes itself felt in
all areas of human endeavor, and it wanes and waxes as an object
of concern, depending upon the relative success and confidence, or
failure and doubt, that accompany action in a particular field at a
particular time. So I shall begin my inquiry with an analysis, cast
in general terms, of the relationship between theory and practice,
with respect both to its ideal form and to the more important deviations from this that occur in fact. I shall next examine the specific
characteristics that this relationship presently exhibits in the field of
law, with the particular intention of identifying as closely as possible
the points at which it has gone astray. I shall then seek to discover
the causes that have led to this predicament, as well as the factors
that have hitherto cushioned its effect and prevented it from becoming
as disastrous as would be expected. Finally, I shall try to indicate
the steps that must be taken if we are to avert the really serious
crisis that now seems to be impending in the life of the law.
I.
The most important truth about theory and practice can be
stated very simply: they are phases of a unitary process. It is emphatically not the case that either of them is a mode of activity that is
self-contained and can be carried on independently of the other.
Rather, they are moments in a synthetic operation, they are mutually
dependent upon one another, and each of them is supported by the
outcome of the other. Theory and practice are as inseparable in their
effective occurrence as are male and female, offense and defense,
nucleus and electron, mass and energy, or plaintiff and defendant.
Consequently, the most serious mistake that we can make in our
approach to theory and practice - in our efforts to understand their
natures and improve the quality of their performance - is to deal with
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them singly and in isolation. Immediately we do this, we fatally
distort the element we are considering by removing it from the
context that gives it meaning and being. The attempt to think either
of them apart from the other must fail, because each derives its essential significance from the relationship in which both stand and the
enterprise to which both contribute. The effort to carry on either
of these activities without recourse to the other is impossible in
principle, and its leads to failure in fact just to the degree that it
succeeds in its perversity. "Pure" theory and "blind" practice are
alike fictions; and when we treat them as real existents, rather than
the artificial abstractions they are, we prepare disaster for ourselves.
These dicta must now be substaniated by an examination of the
unitary process of which theory and practice are moments. This
process I shall designate quite simply "thought," or "the life of the
mind." But is must be emphasized that this is little more than an
arbitrary designation: the process might equally well be identified,
depending on one's philosophical persuasion, as "behavior," "con.consciousness," "reason," or
duct," "adaptation," "existence,"
"spirit." Since I am more than willing, in the present context, to
avoid involvement in these basic issues, I shall describe this process
in neutral and noncommittal terms, and in a way that is within the
reach of common sense familiarity.
By thought or the life of the mind, then, I refer to the distinctive
manner in which man conducts his career, makes his way through
the world, and solves the problems of existence with which nature
confronts all living creatures. All modes of existence involve a passage
through space and time. We (all living things) exist and exert
ourselves within a continuing series of present occasions: we encounter definite objects and situations, these confront us with certain
challenges and opportunities, our natures propose their own demands
and proffer their own powers, and from this complex of circumstances
an action ensues. But this account is obviously incomplete, there
is another side to this matter, and something else needs to be said.
For existence is never altogether contained within the present occasion: what we do in any actual situation is always a function of other
factors besides those that are explicit within this situation. That is,
existence reaches outward beyond its present engagement and extends
itself in time and space: how we act on this occasion is heavily
influenced by what has happened in the past, by what is happening
concurrently elsewhere, and by what might happen in the future.
Of course, the manner in which these dimensions of existence
manifest themselves, and living creatures adjust to and manipulate
them, differs widely from one mode of life to another: existence does
not follow the same channels nor employ the same instruments in
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amoeba, gastropod, spider, monkey, and man. But existence does
always exhibit this same diadic pattern of engagement withinsimultaneously with reference beyond an actual occasion. And it
does always impose the same broad demand that what the living
creature does within the immediate here and now should be relevant
to a wide landscape of there and then.
Man's distinctive way of mastering this demand is through the
use of the powers that we familiarly call memory, anticipation, deliberation, choice, and commitment. As man encounters any actual
situation, he immediately complements and illuminates this with
what he has accumulated and refined from his past experience. He
enriches it with a horde of remembered detail, and he orders it in
relation to other situations by means of a systematic conceptual
apparatus. His further consideration consists of a constant alternation and interweaving of two moments: one of these is a close
scrutiny of the actual situation; the other is a survey of the larger
context in which this occurs. On the great majority of lived occasions,
these two moments do not emerge with any individual distinctness:
the interplay between them is so ready and rapid, they reinforce one
another so coherently, and they move so naturally toward their climax
in an appropriate response, that we do not often become aware of
them as separate elements. But there is still a sufficiently large
absolute number - even though a small percentage - of occasions on
which the preceding conditions do not hold: some situation may
threaten us by its urgency or challenge us by its unexpectedness, in
which case our interest is rooted in the here and now, and we refer
beyond this only to return to it with more immediate effectiveness.
On the other hand, a situation may puzzle us by its novelty or evade
us by its complexity, in which case our interest is largely directed
beyond the present occasion toward a larger real and ideational surround in terms of which we can clarify both the intrinsic character
of the here and now and its relation to the there and then. In situations of these types, of which there are infinite variants, we do
become sharply aware of the fact that existence generates a continual
tension between our engagement in the present occasion and our
need to escape from this.
It is out of this tension that practice and theory emerge as
recognizable modes of human existence and coordinate moments of
the human endeavor. And just here we can get some illumination
and support from etymology. The term "practice," along with its
cognate words, derived from the Greek which means "to do" or "to
effect"; the term "theory" and its cognates derived from the Greek
which means "to see" or "to view." Practice, then carries the connotation of being directly involved in and with something that is
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immediately present, with action as its end. Theory carries the connotation of withdrawing from what is present, in order to view and
contemplate this in a larger and more detached way. Our conduct is
practical just to the degree that it is focused on the actual situation
we confront, and is intended to issue in a line of action that will be
appropriate to this situation and will lead to a desired outcome.
Our conduct is theoretical just to the degree that it is focused on
the larger context of which this actual situation is an element or
incident, and is intended to clarify and extend our understanding
of this situation by establishing the series of relationships that run
between it and other situations.
It must be remembered, as I have already insisted, that practice
and theory in the strict sense are fictions. When we are engaged in
what we call practical activity we continually appeal to an already
developed conceptual apparatus or body of doctrine and tradition a theory - to assist us in the disposition of the situation at hand.
When we are engaged in theoretical activity we just as continually
appeal to our direct encounter with things - to practice - to provide
us with both facts and questions, to confirm or disconfirm our ideas,
and to suggest further inquiries and solutions. Practice and theory
are the products of analysis; they are moments in a process whose
essence is synthesis; and no sort of priority, in the order of either
time or significance, can be assigned to one of them over the other.
This last point is of particular importance. We usually think of
practice as the real bedrock - the aboriginal substance - of life: that
is, we conceive of human existence in its primitive form as being composed of a series of separate particular occasions, where we meet and
deal with the actual things and situations that constitute the body
of the world. Following this line, we think of theory as a late emergent and refinement of life: that is, we conceive of it as a special
employment of mind through which we are able to abstract and
generalize from the horde of separate occasions and so to arrive at
ideas that give us the power to collate and connect these occasions
and establish relationships among them. Now, I think that this is
a gross misinterpretation, and that it has seriously misleading consequences. It not only puts practice in an invidious position, but it
leads to the graver misconceptions: first, that practice can be carried
on quite independently of theory; and second, that it is the highest
aim of theory altogether to detach itself from any reliance upon or
relevance for practice.
Quite to the contrary of all this, I would argue that distinct
present occasions and the framework of space-time relations that
contains them - the here and now and the there and then - make a
simultaneous appearance in consciousness. This is hardly the place
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to indulge in a phenomenological examination of the structure and
genesis of consciousness, so I will merely urge the obvious point that
it is extremely difficult to see how either of these factors could
appear before awareness save by reference to the other. A present
occasion - an actual situation - if it is to be recognized as such, must
be singled out from the flux of occasions. And conversely, a system
of relations - the orderly pattern of nature - can only be discerned if
there are separate occasions to be brought together and related.
So consciousness and the action that it prepares must from their
very inception have been focused equally and concurrently upon the
actual situations in which they were engaged and the larger context
in which these engagements take place. Existence is a continuing
involvement in a perpetual present, but much of its meaning and
relevance must be gathered from what is absent; or, to state the
matter differently and so balance the emphasis, existence is a constant striving toward what is not now, but it can achieve its consummation only by acting in present situations with what is immediately
available. And so it is that practice and theory are coordinate and
inextricable moments in a unitary process.
I have labored these points at length because they are basic to
the problem posed by this symposium and because they are often
grossly misconceived. But with this background the argument can
move more rapidly, and we can proceed at once to the central issue
of the exact character of the interplay and interdependence that hold
between practice and theory. The answer I would suggest can be
briefly stated: it is the essential function of each of these moments
to make explicit what the other leaves implicit. It is in this manner,
with each filling in the lacunae left by the other, that practice and
theory complement one another.
It has been a commonplace since Aristotle that general ideas can
never exhaust particular cases. The concepts, postulates, principles,
and theorems that make up a body of theory always leave a significant
margin of indeterminacy. The statements of causal, functional, and
spatio-temporal relationships that a scientific theory annunciates are
cast in terms of situations that are known to be artificial and contrary
to fact: they assume a closed system, with all relevant factors accounted
for, and ideal conditions (such as a perfect vacuum, constant temperature, pure materials) within this system. Scientists are fully aware
of all this, and close observation and the controlled experiment are
the "practical" methods that they use to complement and correct the
gaps left by theory.
It is even more familiar-and certainly more to the present pointthat a legal system exhibits this same indeterminacy. The norms, rules,
commands, regulations, and procedures that make up a body of
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positive law are necessarily couched in general terms: the precise
meaning they are to bear and the effect they are to have in particular
situations can only be worked out gradually as they are applied in
actual cases. Legal propositions, whether in the form of constitutional provision, legislative enactment, administrative decision, or
judicial precedent, are notoriously vague and ambiguous.
In sum, theory cannot be perfectly explicit either about the outcome of particular cases or about the reverberations of its pronouncements beyond the closed system - the defined context - to which it
has reference. Regarding both of these matters, it leaves very much
only implicit, indeterminate, and uncertain. It is only in the course of
practice - of protracted encounters with particular situations - that
these gaps are filled and these obscurities dispelled. Exactly what
effect a legal enactment or decision will have upon actual human
behavior, and just what extended repercussions it will have beyond
its immediately intended results, are questions that must be settled
by experience. It is in the encounters of practice, and through the
efforts of attorneys and judges, that the meaning of legal concepts
and doctrines is first fully realized, and then refined, extended, or restricted. It took a long while to explore the content of so seemingly
simple a piece of legislation as the Mann Act; and we are still, after
a good many centuries, trying to spell out the requirements of due
process. Legal theorizing, just because it ventures beyond the here
and now into the there and then, must deal in generalities, abstractions, and predictions. It requires the crucible of practice to render
these propositions specific, to confront them with concrete cases, and
so to measure their impact in the real world. It is in this sense that
practice makes explicit what theory leaves only implicit.
Consequently, Justice Holmes's famous dictum, to the effect that
the life of the law has been not logic but experience, has a large
measure of salutary truth. But its should not have been phrased
as a disjunction. For practice is equally dependent upon theory to
supply what it assumes. Pure practice - if there were such a thing would be isolated in the here and now. It would consist of nothing
but a jumble of unconnected episodes, receiving no illumination
from the past, getting no support from what is contemporary but
absent, and having no direction toward the future. Under these
conditions, practice would not even have the dignity of hit or miss,
for there would be no way to distinguish success from failure, much
less to learn from our trials and errors. This is a parody of existence
as we live and know it. For actual practice always implies a context.
Any particular situation that we confront makes, in even our most
unreflective awareness of it, an immediate and varied reference beyond
itself: it suggests resemblances to similar situations and so secures rec-
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ognition as being of a certain kind; it claims its connections with other
situations; and it solicits an habitual response leading toward a
familiar resolution. These facts find formal expression in the legal
doctrine of stare decisis, and they are hallowed every day in every
court where lawyers seek to invoke precedents that are "on all fours"
with the instant case.
This effective presence of what is actually absent is implicated
in all practice. To engage in practice is to anticipate various outcomes, to act with an end in view, and to employ things as means
to this end. That is, practicality requires an educated sense of possibilities, of purposes, and of instrumentalities. The explication of
this rich context of order and connection, which is implied but not
provided by practice, is the work of theory. Practice and theory are
as indissolubly bound together as are the distinct lived occasions and
the continuing self-identity of the individual person.
All of this being so, the proper relationship of theory and practice is one of close and continual converse. This is obvious to the
point of banality. But it still needs to be emphasized, because the
glare of the self-evident readily blinds us to its exact content. In the
present case, this results in our losing sight of the full meaning and
conditions of a fruitful converse. This clearly requires that the two
parties have easy communication with one another. But it also requires - and this we tend to forget - that each party have something
to say. A conversation is a two-way street, a process of give and take,
and it collapses at once if either participant refuses this double role.
Conversation is between equals: it withers at the slightest touch of
the master-slave relationship. If the parties are to maintain this
equality of interchange, each must be doing his own proper work
in a way that makes a valuable contribution to the work of the
other. This does not mean that theory and practice must be in
the position of reciprocal lenders and borrowers: rather, the particular effort that each undertakes simply spills over in the natural
course of events and accrues to the advantage of the other. But if
this is to happen, it does demand that those engaged in theory and
practice must be concerned to extend and refine their respective
areas. If the practitioner is content to merely employ the apparatus
already at his disposal, and the theoretician to bring this to a yet
higher surface polish, their work becomes sterile. A decent measure
of discontent is essential to all constructive work. So the practical
man of affairs must continually challenge the body of theory currently
at his disposal, looking for ways in which this can be modified so
as to improve its treatment of actual cases. And the man of ideas
must be equally alert to the direction in which practice is tending,
so that he can anticipate and correct its course. In sum, the prac-
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titioner and the theoretician stand under an obligation to exercise
what can best be called a constant "initiative of innovation."
These conditions of success can best be met if those engaged in
any pursuit are actively involved at both the practical and theoretical
levels. The same persons should be both developing and operating
the conceptual apparatus. This ideal is difficult to achieve save on
those occasions when some field of human interest and endeavor is
either first being explored and mapped or when it is undergoing
radical revision. During such periods, there is a relatively slight
accumulation of dogma to intervene between local facts and problems
on the one hand and general interpretations and solutions on the
other. Under these conditions, the practitioner must of necessity
create theory to deal with the concrete cases that are his immediate
concern; and the theorist, in his urge for understanding, is impelled
to turn to the world of facts and affairs to both ask and answer
his questions. Here, the line between theory and practice is all but
erased, and the impetus and coherence of inquiry are assured by the
close contact of date and meaning, the here and now and the there
and then.
Unfortunately, such periods neither often occur nor long endure.
As inquiry into any field proceeds, it generates a massive body of
doctrine. This gradually accumulates and crystallizes, and assumes
the form of knowledge and tradition. Such a body of doctrine is
obviously very useful: it answers our questions, solves our problems,
and dictates our procedures. In so doing, it economizes both time
and effort. But it has the dangers of its merits. As it becomes settled
and accepted, it has two most unfortunate consequences: it immediately obtrudes between the theoretician and the practioner, disrupting
communications and undermining their usefulness to one another;
and so it inhibits creative work at both of these levels. Those
engaged in practice can now get the illumination they require - the
explanations, predictions, and techniques of control - from the
deposit of doctrine that previous theoretical work has left behind it;
so they do not feel any strong need to appeal to the theorists for
fresh ideas and insights. Conversely, those concerned with theory can
now get the material they require -the questions, puzzles, and obscurities that challenge inquiry- from this same deposit of doctrine:
that is, they can happily occupy themselves in extending and refining
the conceptual apparatus that they have inherited. So they do not
feel the need to keep in touch with practice either to confirm their
ideas or to secure fresh food for thought. To the extent that the
theoretician and the practioner accept the current body of doctrine,
and are content to work under its guidance, they take on a spurious
independence, both of one another and of any further discoveries.
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Like the physicists of the turn of the century, they can relax and
enjoy their accomplishment, which they find very good indeed, and
can turn over to the graduate students the menial job of keeping
the machinery oiled and doing any minor repairs that may from
time to time be necessary.
Under these conditions, there is little impetus or even opportunity for fresh creative work at the level of either theory or practice.
For each of these efforts alike, the established body of doctrine comes
to be accepted as the foundation and framework that is adequate to
their purposes. The practitioner feels that he need only "apply"
the knowledge and techniques that doctrine already puts at his
disposal, so there is no call for him to appeal further to the theorist
nor to seek on his own to develop new ideas or methods. And the
theorist feels that he need only "reflect" upon what he already knows
in order to generate further knowledge. Practice now becomes
grossly pragmatic and empirical: it assumes that its ends are selfevident and its principles secure; and it seeks only to increase its
effectiveness as a means and to measure its data to a further decimal
place. Theory, if anything, suffers an even sadder fate: deprived of
sustenance from the actual world, it degenerates into polemics,
apologetics, and secular homiletics. In sum, practice becomes an
arrogant glorification of its purported successes, and theory becomes
a pious incantation of its arbitrary creed.
What I have just been depicting are obviously the imaginary
extremes of a continuum that in fact exhibits only intermediate cases.
The marriage of theory and practice is never perfectly harmonious;
but neither is their divorce ever final. As I have emphasized throughout, neither theory nor practice can occur, or indeed be defined,
without reference to the other. But they can and do exist under
widely varying conditions of mutuality or estrangement. What I
now want to do is to examine, against the background of this abstract analysis, the concrete relations that presently hold between
the theoretician and the practitioner of law.
II.
I called attention, in the introductory paragraphs of this paper,
to two points upon which there is very general agreement: first, that
the relationship between legal theory and practice has become seriously dislocated and needs to be restructured; second, that this dislocation itself results from the fact that those engaged respectively
in the theoretical investigation and the practical application of law
have lost effective touch with one another. Instead of a meaningful
dialogue of thought and action, we have these two standing back to
back and delivering monologues into the wings of the stage, while
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they studiously ignore both one another and the audience-which in
this case is the world at large. In itself, this situation partakes
strongly of comedy, and even of burlesque. But its consequences ate
beginning to be tragic. So it becomes a matter of the first importance
to discover why this estrangement - this loss of communication - has
occurred. What is the law suffering from, that its mind and its
members know not what the other does?
To this question I shall offer an abrupt and summary diagnosis.
I think that what afflicts the law is an excessive enlargement and
solidification of the body of legal doctrine. The twin facts of the
existence of this mass of doctrine and of the problems that it poses
are everywhere acknowledged. Law librarians, legal researchers,
teachers of law, practicing attorneys, judges (and even more vehemently, their clerks) all unite in protesting against the sheer accumulation of law with which they have to deal. Indeed, the only parties
who can take any satisfaction in this endless accretion of legislative
statutes, judicial opinions, and administrative rulings are the law
publishers, to whom it is a double bonanza: the larger this morass
of law that they can put between covers and sell, the more need
there is for their digests, manuals, indices, and textbooks.
But despite the intensity of these protests, I still think that they
have missed their mark. In their concern with the superficial aspects
of this problem - the charges it levies on space, time, and money they have failed to see its deeper import. Those who inveigh against
this accumulation of law tend to regard it as merely an inconvenience
or an eye sore. In truth, it is a mortal disease. For this mass of legal
doctrine has become a cancer in the body of the law.
I must emphasize that I mean this as a literal description, not as
a figure of speech. A cancer is a wild and uncontrolled growth; it has
neither structure nor discipline, and its only purpose is proliferation;
it subverts the organism it invades, until this latter renounces all of
its proper goals and functions and becomes only a host to its assassin;
finally, a cancer is blindly parasitic, for it destroys itself in destroying
that upon which it lives.
Now, I would argue that this dead weight of legal doctrine is fast
assuming the form and role of a cancer in the living body of the law.
The immediate effect of this mad growth is that doctrine invades
and subjugates the areas of both theory and practice, and so stifles
creative work at either of these levels. In its early stages, this effect
is neither noticeable in itself nor noticeably deleterious. It simply
means that the theoretician and the practitioner cease to deal directly
with one another, and instead make use of doctrine as a middleman.
The theoretician refines the body of doctrine, draws out the implication of its tenets, turns its ambiguities into distinctions, removes its
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contradictions, and so makes it a more complete and coherent conceptual apparatus. At the same time, the practitioner exposes unanticipated situations and relations that demand new concepts, improvises rules and procedures to fit novel cases, calls attention to conflicts
in the existing corpus of law, eliminates the dead letter of enactment
or precedent by the simple device of ignoring it, and so makes the
body of doctrine a more extensive and effective instrument of action.
Those engaged in theory and practice are alike concerned with law
as a device to promote order and justice, and in this effort they at
once create and employ a body of doctrine without really intending
this or even being aware of it. In the vocabulary of certain contemporary jurists, the practitioner reflects the living law, the theoretician expounds the Natural Law, and between them they embody the
positive law, rather as a couple bent on love engender a child as a
by-product.
But this happy state of affairs soon declines. As the body of legal
doctrine grows more massive, it exhibits three dangerous characteristics: it becomes largely independent of both its source in actual life
and its goal of a better life; it acquires a high degree of inertia; and
it intervenes as an all but impenetrable barrier between theory and
practice.
The effect of this cleavage upon legal theorists and practicing
lawyers is disastrous. The most basic and pervasive demand that is
imposed on all phases of the human endeavor is to stay ahead of
the course of events. Thought must be able to anticipate the contingencies of existence, and action to adapt to its eventualities. In
order to satisfy these demands, the theorist and the practitioner
require a legal apparatus that is open, flexible, and indeterminate
as to its details. The general principles, values, and purposes on which
this system is based, and the more specific rules and procedures
through which it operates, must satisfy two criteria: they must be
sufficiently firm and precise to assure the coherence and continuity
of social movement, and to furnish criteria upon which predictions
and judgments can reasonably be based; but they must also be sufficiently broad and elastic to permit - and even to require - further
experimentation, refinement, and development.
All of this means that an effective system of law needs to be
sensitive to the nuances of the present and the ambiguities of the
future. And it is altogether obvious that the presence of a massive
body of legal doctrine makes this quite impossible. For this body
of doctrine represents primarily the dead weight of the past. As it
accumulates, it assumes the guise of permanence and completeness.
As this process continues, both theory and practice are progressively
cut off from the flux of the present and the thrust of the future.
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This situation weighs differently upon theory and practice. The
theorist, accepting his basic tenets as articles of faith, and isolated
by the body of doctrine from the challenge of facts, spends his time
reiterating his creed, redefining its formulae, and seeking more subtle
arguments in its support. The practitioner, compelled to deal with
the conflicts, confusions, and uncertainties of a society that is looking
for new forms that are intensely felt but only dimly discerned, and
deprived of the creative ideas that could clarify its goals and its
course, can only cut and patch the established body of doctrine and
hope thus to accomodate the changes that are taking place. In sum,
legal theory becomes little more than a ritualistic telling of beads,
with no relevance for the issues that concern men. And practice
becomes a mass of ad hoc solutions, which continually require to be
repaired and corrected. This is what occurs when a body of doctrine
is taken as the factual basis for theory and the conceptual inventory
for practice.
There is, of course, nothing unusual about such situations. One
need only glance through the pages of Buckland or Sohm, of Holdsworth or Maitland, to recognize them as recurrent features of Roman
and English legal history. Periods of extreme ferment and inventiveness, when both the fabric of society and the framework of thought
are undergoing drastic revision, are followed by periods in which the
social and conceptual claims that have been staked out are explored
and brought under control; and these are followed by other periods usually of much longer duration - during which a body of legal
doctrine and a form of social order seek to make their dominance
permanent and absolute. Indeed, this phenomenon is by no means
peculiar to law. It occurs in all areas of human endeavor, and in all
of the professions that serve these. We recognize such periods in the
history of religion, science, morality, art, and even politics and war;
and we refer to them through a rich vocabulary that includes such
terms as formalism, ceremonialism, ritualism, dogmatism, casuistry,
classicism, and bureaucracy.
However, I think that law is peculiarly prone to this doctrinal
cancer and to the inertia and ossification that come with it. There
are several reasons for this. For one thing, the elements with which
law deals - human acts, situations, and relationships - are individually unique and collectively multifarious, and law must be correspondingly universal in its reach and minute in its grasp; this evidently
promotes the accumulation of a mass of detailed doctrine. Furthermore, law is probably the most highly institutionalized of all human
pursuits, and this fosters a rigorous organization of both its material
and its personnel. An even stronger impetus to accrete and rely upon
a body of doctrine comes from the fact that law speaks categorically.
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Acts in law - whether as statutes, decisions, or rulings - have immediate effects in reality: they modify the behavior patterns, the relations, and the situations of men. Law is suspicious of the untried
because it cannot remove its operations to the laboratory and insulate
its theoretical ideas from their practical consequences. Those devices
that have done so much to keep inquiry alert in other regions, such
as the hypothesis, the model, and the controlled experiment are
unavailable to law. The detached attitude of "what if" or "let's
assume" finds legal expression only in law review notes and dissenting
opinions. As has been often noted, it is this circumstance that makes
the court a better forum than the legislature for the development of
new ideas or doctrines, for the court can more closely limit the
impact of its pronouncements. But at all levels of the law, this element of immediacy and finality encourages reliance upon a body of
doctrine that embodies what has worked acceptably in the past.
There is still another factor that has contributed greatly to this
outcome, and one that is particularly relevant because it is now
ceasing to operate. The threads of cause and effect are more tangled
in this case, so they need to be carefully unraveled before they can
be understood and rearranged. To this end, I would propose the
following argument. (1) I think that there has never been any
really high development of legal theory, in the sense of a sustained
and systematic study of the ideal ends that law seeks, the real conditions that it confronts, and the effective means that are at its disposal.
That is, law has existed primarily as an institution and a profession,
and to a much slighter degree as an intellectual discipline. (2) The
reason for this is quite simply that until very recent times there has
been no serious need for such a discipline. (3) And the reason for
this, in turn, is that other agencies supplied the guiding principles
and supporting framework that are the essential contribution of
theory. (4) So theoretical work in the law languished and the body
of legal doctrine accumulated from the joint labors of practicing
lawyers and alien theoreticians, with very little internal discipline.
(5) With no explicit legal theory standing above it, and with the
weight of tradition and dogma behind it, the body of legal doctrine
took on an even greater than usual air of ultimacy and permanence.
We must now trace more closely this purported chain of facts,
examine the contemporary crisis to which it has lead, and see what
this means for legal theory and practice. The keystone of this arch
is supplied by the third proposition advanced above, to the effect that
the institutions and the profession of law have normally received
their theory from other disciplines and influences. I do not have
the time to argue this proposition in detail, so I must hope that it
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will be accepted as an obvious matter of fact.* And indeed it seems
to me truistic that throughout most of its history, law has operated
within an intellectual, moral, and social order that was antecedent
to and independent of it and that controlled its operations. Consequently, law did not have the responsibility - or even the opportunity - of determining the values and purposes it promoted, the
norms and principles it acknowledged and enforced, nor the modes
of behavior it sanctioned. Law inherited the substance of all this
from other sources: the established order, the accepted moral code,
the church, vested interests, custom. Law adopted and implemented
a tradition that was created by other forces, embodied in other institutions, and refined by other disciplines. This is to say that law had
only a limited initiative in defining or changing the pattern or order
within society. This being the case, the complex problems of human
values and social goals, of ideal ends and available means, of future
purposes and present possibilities, of the contingencies and the exigencies of life had all been largely determined before law was called
into play. The function of legal institutions and the legal profession
was simply to translate and effect decisions that had been otherwise
arrived at.
Under these conditions, there was little opportunity and even
less incentive for the development of an intensive and indigenous
discipline of law. Legal theorizing at any high level of generalization
and abstraction was usually regarded as either a dilettante activity
or a presumptuous intrusion. So the body of legal doctrine was largely
the work of practitioners; and though these legal architects were
often extremely perspicacious and dedicated men, they worked under
the immediate impact of social facts and problems and under the
pervasive influence of ideas that had their roots outside of the law.
So this body of doctrine was the product of a strong utilitarian bias
tempered by a sharp sense of justice at the palace gate. The law that
developed in this way was quite adequate as long as two conditions
held: first, that law was a derivative element within the social structure; and, second, that there was a firm social and moral tradition
to give it support and direction.
Now, I take it as an obvious matter of fact that these two conditions are ceasing to hold, and that the process of their erosion is
proceeding at a rapid and cumulative rate. As regards the first, law
is steadily becoming more pervasive and powerful in defining the
content of human and social values; in determining the goals and

*I have argued this point more fully in Legal Institutions, the Legal Profession,
and the Discipline of Law, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 171-177 (1966). In what immediately
follows I have largely paraphrased that argument.
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the course of social action; and in selecting the modes of individual
and group behavior that are to be sanctioned. The processes and the
institutions of law are now being employed to perform many
functions that were formerly undertaken by other agencies, such as
the family, the church, the school, and those rather amorphous, but
still highly articulate and effective entities, the local community and
common opinion. Marriage and divorce, religious practices, race
relations, school administration, standards of public decency and
morality, the distribution of wealth through gift and charity, the
apportionment of political representation: these constitute but a
random sample of areas that law touched only distantly and tangentially and in which it now intervenes constantly and directly. As
has been frequently noted, law is becoming the dominant social force,
and we are being transformed into a legalistic society.
At the same time, the intellectual, social, and moral tradition that
has hitherto given support and structure to law is rapidly disintegrating. The theories of God, nature, man, and society by which law
was fashioned and sustained no longer hold our belief or stir our
feelings. The physical circumstances and social conditions that shaped
the body of legal doctrine have altered greatly. The expectations
and aspirations with which men confront law - the support they
demand from it and the allegiance they yield to it - are quite novel.
Science, technology, and education have not only changed the face
of the earth; they have wrought at least an equal revolution in the
inventory of our beliefs and commitments. In sum, law is operating
more and more in an intellectual, social, and moral vacuum, and so
is being forced to become an autonomous and self-sustaining power.
Because of these drastic changes in its status and its substance,
law now faces a critical situation. Legal institutions and the legal
profession are assuming, partly of their own pretension and partly
because it is thrust upon them, the central role in defining and creating a new social order. And at the same time these institutions and
this profession are witnessing the withering away of the intellectual,
moral, and practical conditions that have served as their milieu of
existence. Law is being stripped of its resources while its responsibilities are being vastly increased.
We can remain unperturbed by this situation only if we assume
that law is capable of generating for itself what has heretofore been
conferred upon it. This is to suppose that law as it now stands will
be able, among the welter of contending views and conflicting interests, to determine the purposes and values it should promote, to direct
the commitments of men and control their energies, and to refashion
the social and physical surround. In a word, it is to assume that law
can become master of the conditions of man's being and well-being.
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Any such assumption as this seems to me to be quite gratuitous and
unwarranted.
The reason for this lies in the two characteristics of law that
I have already emphasized. First, the institutions and the profession
of law have been overwhelmingly oriented toward practice: their
concern is with the solution of actual problems and the disposition
of instant cases. Legal action - the operation of the law - is in response to the immediate appeal of factual circumstances and situations. Second, law deals with this material by applying to it the
established body of legal doctrine: it decides issues and disposes of
cases by reference to its already available substantive and procedural
apparatus. This might be put by saying that local and contemporary
dislocations in the social fabric constitute the matter of law, and the
body of doctrine constitutes its form. Or, as I argued earlier, the
practice of law is centered in the here and now.
Consequently, law, as presently embodied in its institutions and
profession, is neither accustomed nor equipped to deal with the there
and then. But this latter task is precisely the function of theory.
Its successful accomplishment is indispensable to the sound performance of law, or of any other human undertaking. And this taskan adequate acquaintance with the mastery of the there and thenbecomes of critical importance on periods of rapid and radical change
in the course of some undertaking, as regards either its internal
organization or the external circumstances it confronts. Law is clearly
passing through such a period now. So law desperately needs the
assistance of theory. And it cannot supply this for itself out of the
resources it now commands. Obviously, then, law must either obtain
theoretical support elsewhere - from other disciplines - or create a
theoretical arm of its own. A consideration of these alternatives requires a preliminary examination of the exact functions of legal
theory: the fields it must cover and the problems it must resolve.
It is these matters that 1 now wish to explore briefly.
III.
The inquiries that devolve upon legal theory - the facts and
issues it is called on to illuminate - evidently derive from the function of law itself: the tasks assigned to theory reflect the efforts undertaken by practice. Law is a complex phenomenon, and any definition
of it constitutes a proposal for future investigations rather than a
summary of already acquired knowledge. But that, fortunately, is
all I need for my present purposes. So I would suggest that law is
best conceived as an instrument of mediation between the regions
of the actual and the ideal - what is and what ought to be. That is,
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law is an organized agency that man develops in the effort to achieve
a social order that will realize his ideals and aspirations. Law thus
presents three principal facets: the ideal values and goals that it
seeks; the actual social situations and conditions that it is called on
to express; and the apparatus - the instrumentalities, techniques,
and powers - that legal action can command and employ.
These three facets of law define the subject matter of legal theory:
the areas it must explore and the issues it must clarify. As I now
elaborate briefly on these tasks, I shall take the occasion to discuss
the schools and movements in jurisprudence that have been associated
with them, and to comment on their accomplishments and failures.
1. Dimension of the ideal. What is here required of legal theory
is a close and systematic examination of the ends that it is proper
for law to seek. Legal practice cannot possibly acknowledge and
promote all of the ideals and purposes that are proposed to it,
for it often happens that these are both intrinsically impossible and
extrinsically contradictory. So legal theory must analyze the goals
that are urged upon law, in order to clarify and evaluate them and
to measure their feasibility.
These inquiries are the traditional province of Legal Idealism
and Natural Law doctrines. These movements have done much to
keep alive a sense of the moral content and relevance of law, and
to protect the administration of law against the excesses of economic,
political, and ideological pressure groups. Their major failure, I
think, has been a sharp decline in the critical faculty and the sense
of the contemporary. These schools have exhibited a tendency to
merely reiterate and celebrate the ideals and maxims of the past,
without sufficient effort either to clarify them or to relate them to
present concerns and future projects.
2. Dimension of the actual. Here, what is needed from legal
theory is a careful analysis of the actual conditions in which law
operates, and of the possibilities and limitations with which these
confront law. Legal action must be informed of the human interests
and aspirations that are paramount, of the various social forces that
are at work, and of the natural circumstances that influence the
movement of these. Law is not an autonomous force and it does
not operate in a vacuum: it is under constant pressure from various
organized interests; it is an instrument through which social power
of many sorts is exerted; and its acts, since they take effect in a
complex environment, have repercussions far beyond the immediate
situations that precipitate them. So legal theory must explicate the
pattern of order and connection through which law and society act
upon one another.
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These inquiries are the special province of Sociological Jurisprudence and the Jurisprudence of Interests, of which Pound and von
Jhering are the classical exponents. The work of these schools has
been of great value in keeping law alert and responsive to the needs,
the intentions, and the practices of the society it serves: they have
taught law that it is a means to an end and not an end in itself, an
instrument rather than an icon. Their mistake, I think, has been to
inculcate this lesson both too well and too exclusively. The influence
of their teachings has often tended to undermine the integrity and
independence of legal institutions, to minimize their role as valueestimating and decision-making bodies, and so to reduce them to the
position of vehicles to carry out the wishes of whatever social group
or force happens to be able to exert the greatest pressure. In short,
law is regarded as a passive instrument rather than an active participant.
3. Dimension of apparatus. The concern of legal theory in this
context is with the intrinsic character and resources of the law itself.
Conceived institutionally, law is an extremely intricate and precise
instrument: this includes a body of substantive law, rules of procedure, techniques of investigation and trial, forms of decision, modes
of enforcement, and methods of internal change. This complex apparatus requires constant care and correction if its resources are to be
adequate to its functions. It also requires a vigilant assessment of
the powers and limitations of these resources, otherwise they will lie
unused or will be stretched beyond their reach. This task can be
conceived as involving a double effort. One of these seeks to refine
the formal structure - the order and coherence - of the body of
substantive law: this has been the special concern of Analytical
furisprudence and the Pure Theory of Law. The other effort goes
toward improving and extending the operations of procedural law:
this has been the particular province of Legal Realism.
I think it would be generally agreed that it is in this dimension
of law that legal theory has made its most effective contributions.
A great deal has been done to define legal concepts functionally
rather than structurally, to reduce their ambiguity, and so to render
them more relevant and viable. At least as much has been accomplished on the procedural side to make legal remedies more available
and effective. Such failure as has occurred in this dimension is largely
a by-product of success: it has consisted in a fostering of the attitude
that law is a magic panacea that can master all social problems and
correct all human ills.
If we now bring together these three strands of theory, we can
point to the ironic climax to which they have led. Legal Idealism
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has sharpened our sense of the moral quality of law, but has left this
largely without definite and contemporary content. Sociological Jurisprudence has made law sensitive to the human interests and social
tendencies that it serves, but has undermined law's ability to sit in
judgment upon these. Legal Positivism, both Analytical and Realistic,
has greatly strengthened the operation of law, but has eroded our
recognition of any purposes to which these operations should be
directed or any limitations upon their exercise.
And now the irony emerges dearly. For all three movements have
combined to magnify both the actual power of law and the sense
of obligation to put this power to the service of human good. But
they have equally combined to deprive law of guidance as to precisely how this power should be used. Law has been made more
intensely subject both to the call of conscience and to social coercion;
and at the same time its ability to resist, absorb, and evaluate these
pressures has been seriously weakened. Finally, these trends of
theory have been greatly accelerated in their movement and exaggerated in their effects by the march of events and the transformation
of the actual scene that we have noted earlier.
It is this complex of circumstances, issuing in this paradoxical
situation, that makes the revival of legal theory so imperative a
demand. As matters now stand, we seem inclined to muster law in
the support of any cause whatsoever that has wide popular support,
strong emotional appeal, or a sound moral claim. In short, the administration of law is seriously deteriorating toward what can best
be called "legal sentimentality."
To correct this movement, law must find purposes to match its
power, breadth of outlook to control its concern for particular ills,
and internal stability to balance the forces that bear upon it. These
are the gifts that legal practice - the institutions and the profession
of law -badly need from theory. Without such theoretical support,
law threatens to degenerate into an unwholesome mixture of justice
at the palace gate, might makes right, and ad hoc solutions. The
question is, where should law seek this support? From within, or
from outside sources? By developing a theoretical discipline of its
own, or by accepting guidance from other disciplines? This is a
large issue, and I am happy to be able to plead the limitations of
space and time and so to make only two general suggestions regarding it.
In the first place, I would very strongly urge that legal theory
must be developed from within the context of law itself. That is,
the profession and the institutions of law must undertake the task
of creating an intellectual discipline of law that will reflect their
own concerns and problems and will express their implicit values
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and purposes. The argument in support of this position is simple.
Any other discipline or profession from which law might borrow
theoretical guidance - and there are certainly plenty of them more
than willing to offer it - inevitably has its own special interests,
projects, and goals. Consequently, there is a large possibility that
the ideas and ideals that they propose to law will be both prejudiced
and inappropriate. When these alien groups address themselves to
law, they have their own aims in mind and are interested chiefly
in using law as a means to their ends. And even if they achieve
disinterestedness, they are not likely to have a close acquaintance
with the internal structure and operation of the legal apparatus. I
think that law clearly has certain values and criteria which, if not
uniquely its own, at least receive a quite special interpretation and
realization in their legal embodiment: examples are the meanings
and the procedures that cluster around such concepts and doctrines
as those of justice, equity, reasonableness, fairness, due process, responsibility, binding obligation, duty, and many others. To protect these
notions against dilution and adulteration, and to bring them to full
realization, law must generate a theory that is properly its own.
In the second place, I think that this theory of law must be the
work of men who are trained and habituated to the practice of law.
With the rare expections afforded by genius or happy insight, the
theoretician has got to be well-grounded in his field, intimately acquainted with the realities that his ideas must confront and the
problems that these realities pose. And with equally rare exceptions,
such grounding can only come from direct encounters with facts and
involvement in the effort to deal with them. So I am not suggesting
the creation of a special class of "legal theorists," an intellectual elite
that would issue directions to its humbler brethren of the bar and
bench. Rather, I am proposing that law schools should find a significant place in their curricula for the study of legal theory, and should
make a serious effort to assure that when their students graduate
they will be prepared to enter not only the practice of law, but also
its theory.
There is nothing radical or revolutionary about this proposal.
It simply means that students should be trained and stimulated to
think about the law as well as to apply it; to extend and refine their
discipline, as well as to accept it and work within it; to recognize
that the law is a calling, not merely a skill. Every other professional
school at least pretends to accept this responsibility as a matter of
course. And since lawyers are called to the bar, they should be the
more ready to do so.
There is an additional reason why lawyers should be peculiarly
fitted to merge the functions of practitioner and theoretician, and
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so to have their theory emerge from their practice. This consists in
the familiar fact -whose very familiarity has bred if not contempt
at least neglect - that all of those who are engaged in the work of
the law occupy a dual role. The attorney is at once the advocate
of his client's interest and an officer of the court - that is, a minister
of justice. And the judge is at once the trier of the instant case and
the voice of the legal system that he serves. So each of these is
constantly solicited to effect a conjunction of the particular and the
general, the concrete and the abstract, the actual and the ideal, in a
word, the here and now and the there and then. Every issue at law
is a challenge to the body of legal doctrine; and every legal decision
is an application of principles to facts. The practice of law is an
encounter that will naturally engender theory unless the most stringent contraceptive measures are employed. I would judge that the
two greatest hindrances to this fruitful union are the case method
that is inflicted on students and the overcrowded dockets that burden
judges. The case method encourages the student -and so habituates
the future lawyer -to regard the established body of legal doctrine
as the last word on the subject, and to seek merely to accommodate
the instant case to it in such a manner as to get the most satisfactory
outcome. The crowded dockets of our courts make it almost mandatory for judges to settle cases in the most expeditious way, and this
is obviously through the mechanical application of settled law. So
the practicing attorney and the presiding judge are in an unacknowledged - and largely unconscious - compact to avoid theory at
all costs and to get on with the work at hand. The larger issues
raised by the instant case- the legal implications and social reverberations of various decisions, the intricate interplay of ideal, actual,
and apparatus - all of this, which is the field of theory, suffers neglect
because those who practice law have been systematically deprived
of both the incentive and the opportunity to cultivate it. If we can
only soften the impact of the case method and the crowded docket,
then I think that the practitioners of law must spontaneously escape
from the here and now to roam in the there and then. That is, they
will experience a glorious sea change and become theoreticians in
spite of themselves. This has happened in the past, and the law we
now enjoy is its happy issue. We lie under a heavy obligation to
the future to make it happen again, and soon.
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